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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
uring the last twelve years, the drawbacks of the simple rules stated in the 1988
Basel Capital Accord on minimum capital requirements have become
increasingly apparent. To address such shortcomings, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision has been engaged for several years in a revision process that will
finally lead to a New Basel Capital Accord (henceforth NBCA).
This report aims to provide a complete, up-to-date, critical picture of the NBCA, by
summarising its structure and possible changes. We first briefly review the structure of
the proposal issued in January 2001 (the so-called ‘consultative package 2’, or CP2). A
thorough introduction to the mathematical model underlying the NBCA risk weights is
also presented, to enable the reader to understand the technical steps leading to the new
capital requirements.
Several features are then discussed in detail. The main issues can be summarised as
follows:
Asset correlations. The asset correlation levels used in the CP2 would lead to a sharp
increase in the overall capital requirements for banks and financial institutions all over
the world. Such a rise in bank capital levels, although enhancing savers’ protection and
financial stability, might also turn out to be socially undesirable as it leads to an
increase in the cost of credit. Moreover, rationing problems might arise, forcing banks
to cut their loan portfolios and thus reducing credit supply to non-financial firms.
We show that the use of lower asset correlation coefficients for riskier borrowers
represents a reasonable way of making capital requirements less demanding, reducing
the threat of a generalised increase in the cost of credit.  The Basel Committee itself
proposed such a solution through an informal note in November 2001. This seems to be
a step in the right direction, and would reduce the risk of adopting an overly
conservative supervisory scheme.
Expected and unexpected losses.  The new regulation should fully acknowledge the
difference between expected and unexpected losses (ELs vs. ULs), and supervisors
should ask banks to make use of this distinction in their pricing and provisioning
practices. ELs represent the mean of the distribution of future losses and should be dealt
with as a cost, not as a risk. ULs, on the other hand, might not materialise for many
years. In order to face them, banks have to ask their shareholders to provide them with
an adequate amount of capital, so to avoid bankruptcy if actual losses exceed expected
ones.
It has been suggested that ELs be excluded from regulatory capital, since they are
shielded by the banks’ future margins. Such a perspective was cautiously endorsed by
the Basel Committee in its November 2001 note, at least for retail portfolios (other than
mortgages), and would bring in a sharp decrease in capital requirements against credit
cards, revolving credits and similar forms of consumer financing (where default rates
tend to be high but stable, and ELs represent a considerable share of future losses). Such
an approach, however, might prove ineffective when an economic downturn increases
the default rates on consumer loans, while reducing the amount of new loans demanded
by individuals and families (and the margins earned by the lender).
DTHE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
ii
Rather, one should encourage banks to make provisions against expected losses,
charging their costs against current revenues, not against future ones.
The PD/LGD correlation. The credit risk measurement schemes followed by the Basel
Committee might prove somewhat inaccurate if default and recovery risk respond – to
some extent – to the same background factors. Namely, capital requirements risk
becoming downward biased if PD (probability of default) and LGD (loss given default)
are driven by some common causes, and show a significant, positive correlation.
Altman et al. (2001) show that, at least as far the US bond market is concerned, such a
correlation emerges rather clearly from the data of the last 15 years. Recovery rates tend
to decrease as defaults become more frequent, suggesting a strong link between these
two sources of risk.
Procyclicality. The Basel rules are based on a minimum ratio between bank capital and
weighted assets. In the NBCA, as in the 1988 protocol, losses reduce capital (the
numerator in the quotient) when the economic cycle deteriorates and defaults become
apparent. Furthermore, in the New Accord, weighted assets (the denominator) increase
as borrowers are downgraded, due to an economic downturn. To comply with the
regulatory 8% limit in the capital ratio, banks are then forced to reduce credit supply
and to increase the cost of loans; which in turn, makes recessions even worse.
Such ‘procyclicality’ effects are investigated in this report, by means of a numerical
simulation based on 1980–2000 data. We find that, by imposing compulsory provisions
against expected losses, the risk of credit rationing in ‘bad’ years could be significantly
reduced (although procyclical shifts due to rating transitions would still exist).
Moreover, we show that if banks adopting the ‘advanced’ approach to internal ratings
should update their LGD estimates based on the credit risk cycle, the procyclicality
effects of the new Basel protocol might be much stronger than expected.
Credit availability for less developed countries (LDCs). The NBCA might exert some
strong adverse consequences for developing countries.  It  would bring about tougher
capital requirements for high-risk borrowers, which form the customer base of most
LDC banks, excluding them from bank lending and/or increasing the cost of bank
finance up to unbearable levels. Moreover, the complexity of the Accord would bring
about high compliance and implementation costs, not only for banks but also for their
regulators. Finally, sophisticated banks from industrialised countries operating in the
LDCs might enjoy a strong competitive advantage compared to small, local banks.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the costs incurred by an  LDC-based bank
developing an  internal ratings-based (IRB)  system would actually lead to a true
improvement in its risk-measurement techniques.  The lack of robust, long-term
historical default data for all classes of borrowers could make the risk-assessments very
subjective, thereby weakening the effectiveness of the NBCA and exacerbating its
procyclicality.
Implementation costs. This is the first, and most certain channel through which the
NBCA is going to affect the profitability of individual banks. Complexity is one of the
most striking features of the new Accord, and setting up some ‘Basel-compliant’ risk-
control systems is going to be a major challenge both for bankers and their supervisors.
Complexity costs are expected to be particularly high in the European Union, where theTHE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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implementation process is going to be especially cumbersome. A rough estimate of the
implementation costs of Basel II suggests that these might well exceed $1,000 billion,
which amounts to a considerable share of all Tier 1 capital held by banks in the world
(which the Institute for International Finance estimates at about $2,000 billion).  This
means that, at least in the short-term, the first effect of a regulatory reform intended to
improve the banks’ capital adequacy might be to erode a considerable portion of it.
Market equilibria. A stronger uniformity will be the result of the adoption, by many
banks, of the same risk-management tools and procedures. This might prove beneficial,
if financial institutions are forced to move towards the ‘efficient frontier’ by adopting
more sophisticated and rigorous practices.  Unintended consequences might follow,
however,  that reduce the degree of efficiency and stability of the system. As far as
stability is concerned, the adoption of a uniform risk-assessment model by all market
participants is likely to magnify the swings in the economic and financial cycle; as for
the banking system’s efficiency, a more pervasive regulation (think of the second pillar,
enabling supervisors to influence and shape the banks’ risk evaluation practices) runs
the risk of reducing the role of markets, cancelling out the differences between ‘good’
and ‘bad’ bankers.1
THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
STRUCTURE, POSSIBLE CHANGES AND
MICRO- AND MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
ANDREA RESTI
1.  Introduction
During the last twelve years, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord dealing with minimum
capital requirements for internationally active financial institutions has grown more and
more pervasive, being integrated into national regulations in most advanced countries.
Meanwhile, the limitations and drawbacks of the simple rules on which it is based have
become increasingly apparent. In other words,  the existence of a considerable gap
between supervisory requirements and risk-based measures of economic capital has led
to forms of regulatory arbitrage (whereby loopholes in the regulation have been
exploited to increase the real leverage of a bank without reducing its capital ratios).
Paradoxically, the inability of the 1988 protocol to discriminate between investment
grade and junk borrowers might also have made some financial institutions more risk-
seeking, instead of helping them control their risks.
To address such challenges, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been
engaged for several years in a revision process that will finally lead to a New Basel
Capital Accord (NBCA). Remarkably, the new Accord is not being engineered inside a
secluded laboratory by a handful of regulators and financial rocket-scientists, but its
contents have been thoroughly discussed by national supervisors, banks and academics.
Thus, the NBCA drafting has become a meeting point for many different perspectives:
legal experts, accountants, bank managers, central bankers, finance scholars (to  name
only a few) have been working together, merging their professional backgrounds to
make the NBCA more robust in its structure and parameters.
This report tries to provide a complete, up-to-date, critical picture of the new Basel
approach to bank capital, by summarising its structure and possible changes, and by
focusing on some limitations and pitfalls that might deserve further investigation.
Section  2 quickly reviews the basic framework of the reform proposal released in
January 2001 (the so-called Consultative Package 2, or CP2
1) and the mathematical
model underlying the capital requirements on internally  rated loans. Some simple
mathematical and statistical tools are also reviewed, since they are important in order to
appreciate the modification proposals discussed by supervisors, practitioners and
academics over the last months.
A selection of these modification proposals is discussed in Section 3, where the main
adequacy and calibration issues are outlined. We consider what steps must be taken to
avoid a generalised increase in capital levels, and what possible omissions must be
carefully addressed to improve the NBCA effectiveness. These include the need to
distinguish carefully between the capital requirements dictated by expected losses, and
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those due to unexpected losses.  Moreover, we stress the need to investigate the
empirical link between defaults and recoveries, since a positive correlation between
these two sources of risk might lead to a systematic underestimation of future credit
losses.
Section 4 focuses on the main effects that the NBCA is likely to exert both on financial
markets (macro effects) and on individual banks (micro features). The former include
the risk of reducing credit supply to less developed economies and, above all, the
danger of making credit supply strongly procyclical, exacerbating cycles that bank
regulation should, in principle, level out. Some computer-based simulations are carried
out to see whether the risk-weight calibrations proposed in recent months would really
ease the problem. We evaluate the effect on procyclicality of a compulsory provisions
regime, and  also  the risk that the empirical link between default probabilities and
recovery rates  may  make procyclicality even worse than expected. As concerns the
microeconomic effects of the new Basel Accord, we briefly analyse its implementation
costs and try to figure out how it will change the way banks compete in originating and
maintaining their loan books.
This report is part of a long-term commitment by  CEPS to monitor and discuss –
through research papers, workshops and roundtables – the NBCA revision process. I
would like to thank Karel Lannoo and Rym Ayadi for providing me with valuable
suggestions and hints on the structure and aims of this work.
2. Towards Basel III: A review of the 2001 proposals
This  section is dedicated to the basic structure of the reform proposal released in
January 2001 (the so-called Consultative Package 2, or CP2) and discussed by
supervisors, practitioners and academics in the subsequent months.
It consists of two parts. The first briefly recalls the basic structure and aims of the CP2,
which should by now be well known to most readers and the second one is dedicated to
a quick review of the mathematical model underlying the capital requirements on
internally rated loans. Note that this model not only builds the core of the January 2001
proposal, but also plays a pivotal role in most changes suggested in  recent months.
Therefore, a quick analysis of its structure will enable us to better understand the
possible drawbacks in the CP2 that were highlighted after its release, and the
modifications likely to be implemented in the new version of the Accord, due to be
released by the end of this year.
2.1 The January 2001 draft: Basic features
According to the CP2, bank supervision will be based on three components (the so-
called ‘pillars’ of the NBCA), i.e. minimum capital requirements, supervisory review
process and market discipline. Although all of them are equally meaningful in the
supervisors’ eyes, most comments and criticisms have focused on the first pillar, since it
contains some precise, quantitative rules for computing the new minimum capital
requirements, and any change in such rules is likely to have a deep impact on bank
leverage, profitability and the price of bank credit for the real economy.
As concerns credit risk capital, the CP2 marks a break with the past, since loans issued
to similar counterparts (e.g. private firms or sovereigns) will require different capitalTHE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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coverage depending on their intrinsic risk, as evaluated by some external rating
institution (‘standard approach’) or by the bank itself (‘internal ratings-based’, or IRB
approach).
In the standard approach, the amount of capital required on a €1 loan to a private firm
(now fixed at 8 eurocents) could decrease to 1.6 eurocents or increase to 12 eurocents,
based on the ratings issued by external credit assessment institutions.
2 However, the
capital ratio for unrated borrowers (which build the vast majority of a bank’s loan
portfolio, and tend to be riskier than rated ones) would stay unchanged at 8%, in order
to avoid any dramatic change in the total capital requirement.
3
If a bank chooses to create its own rating system (instead of depending on external
agencies), it will face two options: a simplified, or ‘foundation’ IRB approach and a
more ‘advanced’ one. In the foundation approach, the bank is responsible only for
measuring (in a transparent and reliable way) the probability of default (PD) of its
borrowers. However, this is just one of the basic components originating credit risk; the
other ones (loss given default or LGD, exposure at default or EAD, maturity) are set at
some fixed levels by the supervisors.
4 In the advanced approach, on the other hand, the
bank will be responsible for estimating all the parameters required for credit risk
measurement, although it will have to prove to supervisors that such estimates are based
on a wide empirical dataset and are consistent with its own loss experience in the
previous years.
5
The risk parameters of each loan (PD, LGD, EAD and maturity) are turned into a capital
requirement by means of an algebraic formula based on a simple credit risk model (see
section  2.2 below). Capital ratios increase linearly with LGD and EAD, less than
linearly (although quite steeply) with default probability.
The bank’s final capital target is then computed simply as the sum of all individual
requirements. Subadditive portfolio models,
6 e.g. credit VaRs, are not admitted, but an
adjustment is performed to account for portfolio ‘granularity’. This acknowledges the
                                                
2 As noted by Altman and Saunders (2001), the capital requirements associated with different ‘risk
buckets’ envisaged in the standard approach do not reflect the different quality levels associated with
agency ratings. For example, the ‘best’ loans (rated AAA to AA-) command a 1.6% capital charge even if
their historical default rates look almost immaterial. At the opposite end of the scale, the dominant ‘junk
bond’ rating (single B) and the lowest (and far less common) CCC rating are combined into the same
bucket, even though the empirical evidence on rated bonds suggests that the default probability is much
greater for the latter than for a single B issue.
3 Note that, even so, the total capital charge for banks adopting the standardised approach shows a
significant increase when operational risk is added (see below).
4 Note that such standard levels are not constant for all loans, but vary with the degree of riskiness of the
underlying loans. For example, while LGD is fixed at 50% for senior, unsecured facilities, it can be lower
for loans backed by financial collateral (or by some kinds of ‘physical’ collateral, such as residential
estate).
5 Following a so-called ‘evolutionary’ approach, banks will first be prompted to adopt the foundation
approach. Only as they grow more confident about their internal estimates (and can show the regulators
the databases on which those estimates are based) will they be allowed to move to the advanced approach.
6 A risk measure is said to be subadditve if the total risk (therefore also the total capital requirement) of a
pooled loan portfolio is less than the sum of the risks (and capital requirements) of the individual loans.
Note that, since different loans tend to be imperfectly correlated, thereby allowing for some risk
diversification, sensible risk measures always tend to be subadditive.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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fact that portfolios formed by a high number of small facilities tend to be less risky than
those based on a set of large loans. Nevertheless, the different degree of correlation
between various groups of obligors (i.e. firms belonging to different industries or
geographical areas) is not accounted for, and all borrowers are supposed to be affected
by the same macroeconomic drivers.
Finally, the new capital requirements will not be limited to credit risk (as in the 1988
Accord
7), and a considerable amount of capital will have to be held against operational
risk (i.e. the risk that flaws in a bank’s own systems or human resources, as well as
external events, may cause unexpected losses, e.g. due to mass litigation, fraud or
natural catastrophes). Namely, according to the January 2001 draft, as much as 20% of
total bank capital should be set aside for operational risks. Since for many small banks
credit risk capital is likely to remain roughly unchanged, this would lead to a 25%
increase in the total requirement.
2.2 An overview of the model used to generate capital requirements against
credit risk
The risk weights used in the CP2 and in the subsequent materials issued by the Basel
Committee are based on a simple credit risk model.  This section quickly reviews its
structure, to enable the reader to fully understand the comments made later in the report.
Note that another quick introduction can be found in Finger (2001), while a more
detailed and rigorous presentation of the model is available in Gordy (2001).
Consider a credit portfolio made up of a huge number of small loans (that is, an
‘infinitely granular’ portfolio). Each borrower defaults if and only if the value of his or
her assets falls below some default threshold at a given time horizon (e.g. if one year
later the asset value falls below the value of the debts that have to be repaid at that date).
The per cent change in the asset value of borrower i can be expressed as:
i i w Z w Z e ￿ - + ￿ =
2 1 [1]
that is, as a linear combination
8 of two components: factor Z, which responds to the
macroeconomic cycle (and therefore affects all borrowers in the same way) and factor ei
which depends only on the borrower’s individual (i.e. idiosyncratic) risk. Depending on
the factor loadings, a borrower can be more or less exposed to the cycle. As w increases,
all obligors tend to be more and more correlated among themselves, whereas a decrease
in w means that idiosyncratic features prevail and that all borrowers are more and more
independent.
Note that this is probably a simplistic way of representing the effect of macroeconomic
forces on a firm’s asset value. A multifactor model, with two or more random variables
accounting for the different factors that drive the state of the economy (such as inflation,
                                                
7 Note that, however, the original Accord was amended in 1996 to accommodate some sources of market
risk, mainly on foreign currencies and trading portfolios.
8 Note that since Z and ei have variance one, and the variance of the sum of two independent random
terms, var(ax1+bx2), always equates a
2var(x1)+b
2var(x2), one has to impose that a
2+b
2=1 in order to make
sure that Zi follows a standard normal distribution. In our case, this is done by setting the second weight
equal to the square root of 1-w
2, where w is the first weight.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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foreign exchange, unemployment, interest rates and so on) would probably be more
realistic, and would account for the fact that different firms respond to different macro
drivers. However, such a model, although well known to credit risk scholars,
9 would be
somewhat  impractical  for regulatory purposes.
10  This is why the Basel Committee
decided to stick to a single-factor model such as the one we are presenting here.
Both Z and ei are thought to follow a standard normal distribution; from equation 1, it
follows that Zi is standard normal-distributed too. Note that, for any pair of obligors, the
correlation between per  cent changes in their asset values (henceforth  ‘asset
correlation’) is:
( )
2 , w Z Z j i = r [2]
Now, let  pi be the unconditional (i.e. independent of the macro factor) default
probability for obligor i. Then the per cent decrease in the asset value that makes obligor
i hit his or  her default threshold is a, such that F(a)=pi (see Figure 1), where F(.)
denotes the standard normal cumulated density function. This means that firm i defaults
if and only if  a < i Z .
Now, suppose we know that the macro factor is going to take value Z*. Then:
i i w Z w Z e ￿ - + ￿ =
2 1 * [3]
and firm i defaults if and only if:
a e < ￿ - + ￿ = i i w Z w Z
2 1 * [4]
that is, if
( )
2
1
2 1
*
1
*
w
Z w p
w
Z w i
i
-
￿ - F
=
-
￿ -
<
- a
e [5]
Since ei follows a standard normal distribution, the default probability for obligor  i,
conditional on Z=Z*, is as simple as:
( ) ) , ; (
1
*
2
1
* w p Z f
w
Z w p
p i
i
Z Z i =
œ
œ
ß
ø
Œ
Œ
º
Ø
-
￿ - F
F =
-
= [6]
                                                
9 See e.g. Credit Suisse Financial Products (1997) or Gupton et al. (1997), on the CreditRisk+ and
Creditmetrics models, respectively. Note, however, that a single-factor version of the latter was proposed
by one of its authors (Finger, 1999) to make computations faster.
10 A multi-factor model would make computations more complex and, above all, it would make capital
requirements on a new loan dependent on the composition of each bank’s portfolio.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Figure 1. The default threshold expressed as a per cent decrease in asset value
p i= F(a)
Z i
a = F - 1(p i)
f( Z i)
Note that, since our portfolio is infinitely granular, the empirical default rate
experienced when  Z=Z* equals this conditional default probability. In other words,
similar to what happens in Montecarlo experiments, as the number of draws becomes
larger, random (idiosyncratic) error fades away and observed distributions tend to
coincide with theoretical ones. The conditional probability shown in equation [6]
therefore can also be thought of as the loss our credit portfolio will actually stand, given
a €1 exposure and a 100% LGD, if the macroeconomic factor takes value Z*.
However, we do not know what value factor Z will take. Infinite values for Z* may
generate infinite values for our future losses. Yet, since we know that  Z follows a
standard normal distribution, where the X-th percentile can be denoted as:
X Z Z i x = F ) ( [7]
we can use equation [6] to pick up a loss value L, such that it will be exceeded only X%
of the times. Clearly, this is:
( ) ( ) ) , , (
1
) , ; (
2
1 1
* w p X g
w
X w p
p w p Z f L i
i
Z Z i i X =
œ
œ
ß
ø
Œ
Œ
º
Ø
-
F ￿ - F
F = = =
- -
= [8]
This equation gives us the amount of capital that will cover (1-X%) of all possible
losses. Choosing X=0.5% and r=w
2=20% one gets a capital requirement that depends
only on the obligor’s unconditional PD:
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ] 288 . 1 18 . 1
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) 576 . 2 ( 447 . 0
% 20 1
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[9]
which builds the core of the weighing function described in the January 2001 draft.
To be able to view our default rate as a per-euro loss we imposed a 100% LGD. This
assumption can be easily relaxed by scaling down the capital requirement according to
the real LGD (in practice, assuming that a €2 loan with a 50% LGD can be treated like a
€1 loan with a 100% LGD
11):
                                                
11 Note that LGDs are treated as deterministic. In other words, once a bank has estimated the LGD on a
loan, this forecast is always correct, and no additional risk can arise from the fact that actual LGDs can beTHE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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( ) [ ] 288 . 1 18 . 1 ) , , (
1 + F ￿ F ￿ @ ￿ =
-
i i p LGD w p X g LGD L [10]
This formula is based on a default model and therefore covers only default risk. Long-
term loans, however, might experience a decrease in their fair value just because the
obligor has been downgraded, and the future cash flows on the loan have to be
discounted using higher credit spreads. We therefore should adjust the formula to
account for different maturities, increasing the capital required against loans lasting
more than one year. This can be done by multiplying L by a ‘maturity factor’ such as
the following one:
) 1 (
) 1 ( 0235 . 0
1
44 . 0 -
- ￿
+ = M
p
p
b
i
i
pi [11]
This factor amounts to one (implying no change in L) when the loan maturity M is one
year. Longer maturities bring about an increase in capital and this increase tends to be
more significant for high-quality borrowers, since they are more exposed to downgrade
risk.
Suppose that the average maturity of bank loans is  three  years. Then the formula
becomes:
44 . 0
) 1 ( 047 . 0
1
i
i
p p
p
b
i
- ￿
+ = [12]
And the overall capital requirement L*=L￿b amounts to:
( ) [ ] ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
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-
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i
i
i p
p
p LGD b L L [13]
To get the weighing function used in the CP2, we still have to add in a prudential
scaling factor of 1.56, which is supposed to account for possible measurement errors in
the banks’ rating systems, and for the fact that Tier 2 instruments (such as subordinated
loans) show a weaker loss-bearing capacity than core capital. Adding this scaling factor,
we finally get the capital requirement on corporate loans indicated in the January 2001
document:
( ) [ ] ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿ - ￿
+ ￿ + F ￿ F ￿ ￿ =
-
44 . 0
1 ) 1 ( 047 . 0
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i
i
i p
p
p LGD L [14]
(see Basel Committee, 2001a). More generally, the capital requirement based on this
model can be expressed as:
( ) ( )
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[15]
                                                                                                                                              
higher than expected. However, recovery risk exists and should be factored into a bank’s credit risk
computations. See e.g. the discussion in Frye (2000) and Altman et al. (2001).THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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where, by setting s=1.56, M=3, X=0.5%, w
2=r=20%, one gets back to the CP2 capital
requirement on corporate loans
12 shown in equation [14]. Reducing asset correlation r
to 8.1–8.2%, one gets the CP2 capital requirement on retail exposures.
13
3. Towards Basel III: Some changes that might (or should) be implemented
The overall framework of the CP2 met the appreciation of the banking and financial
community, and was welcome as a significant step towards a closer integration between
regulatory and economic capital. As noted by the Basel Committee itself,  however,
many of the procedures and rules indicated in the draft might require some further
calibration. Namely:
1.  Since the Accord is not meant to raise capital requirements for the whole financial
system, but only to make capital closer to risks on an individual basis, some steps
must be taken to avoid a generalised increase in capital levels.
2.  All possible flaws, omissions and inconsistencies must be carefully addressed, also
to minimise the risk of generating some new kind of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ like those
prompted by the 1988 agreement.
3.1  Appropriateness of overall capital requirements
We first consider the risk of a generalised increase in capital levels. The Basel
Committee has been promoting some simulations, or ‘impact studies’, in which a large,
international sample of banks has tried to estimate the effect that the new Basel rules
would exert on their capital requirements. The results of such simulations have
highlighted that, although some banks might experience a decrease in their regulatory
capital, most of them would face a sharp rise, especially when adopting the so-called
IRB foundation approach.
Table 1 and Figure 2 summarise the main findings of the impact study carried out by the
Basel Committee in the second half of 2001.
14 As can be seen from the table, both the
standardised and IRB foundation methods would bring about a considerable increase in
total capital requirements for all groups of banks. However, although in the standardised
framework the upsurge in capital ratios can be ascribed mainly to non-credit risks,
15
both operational and credit risk capital would considerably rise for banks implementing
a ‘simplified’ internal ratings system.
                                                
12 In the CP2, all capital requirements are capped at 100%, in other words, a bank may never be asked to
set aside an amount of capital higher than the loan it refers to.
13 This reduction accounts for the well-known fact that retail loans are influenced more by individual
(idiosyncratic) risks and therefore allow a higher degree of diversification, even though they are usually
riskier than corporate exposure on a stand-alone basis.
14 This is usually referred to as the ‘QIS 2’ (Quantitative Impact Study 2) exercise. Details can be found
in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001b).
15 Note that the capital charges against operational risk used in the QIS 2 exercise were significantly
lower than those stated in the CP2. While the latter suggested that operational risks absorb some 20% of
total capital, QIS 2 data were adjusted, reducing the relative weight of operational risks to 10-12%.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Table 1. Changes in capital requirements under the CP2* proposals
Standardised IRB foundation IRB advanced
Credit Overall Credit Overall Credit Overall
Large, internationally active G-10 banks +6% +18% +14% +24% -5% 5%
Smaller/specialised G-10 banks +1% +13%
Large, internationally active EU banks +6% +18% +10% +20% -1% 9%
Smaller/specialised EU banks -1% +11%
Non-G-10, non-EU banks +5% +17%
*After cutting operational risk charges – see footnote 15 below.
Source: Basel Committee estimates based on a sample of 138 banks.
•  As concerns operational risks, the introduction of a heavy capital requirement has
been extensively criticised in the last months. First, the definition of operational
risk given in the CP2 is still too wide-ranging and vague.  Furthermore, the
techniques and databases used to measure this category of risk are yet in their
early days, and it might be unwise to link them to an explicit (and costly) capital
requirement before they are adequately tested in the years to come. Finally, given
the ‘idiosyncratic’ nature of most operational risks (which, unlike financial risks,
appear to be mostly uncorrelated to each other), it has been argued that they
should not attract any compulsory capital charge, since bank regulation is aimed at
protecting consumers and markets from systemic risks, not at preventing
individual banks from failing.
16
•  Turning to  credit risk, the capital increase shown by most banks can be
decomposed into its main drivers. For example, Figure 2 (still based on the Basel
Committee’s QIS 2), shows how the 14% rise experienced by large, international
banks under the foundation approach can be broken up into its main components:
while capital requirements due to retail loans experience a reduction, the
corporate, sovereign and interbank portfolios are the main causes of the overall
increase.
17 This is consistent with some estimates referred to single banking
systems or carried out by international associations. For example, Maino (2001)
reckons that Italian banks adopting the foundation approach would experience an
increase of about 17% in capital requirements due to corporate loans, while the
capital charges against retail facilities would be cut roughly by 10%.  Other
members of the Institute of International Finance in their own individual impact
studies achieved similar results.
                                                
16 As noted by Danielsson et al. (2001), ‘failures that are due to market or credit risk can spread because
they arise out of shocks that are common to many participants.  Operational risk is fundamentally
different, however – it is in most cases purely idiosyncratic: hence the argument from contagion is largely
irrelevant here.’ Similar concerns were raised by Goodhart (2001), who noticed that ‘the introduction of
this new capital requirement will add a further layer of complexity and bureaucracy to the regulatory
process in the financial field. The positive case why it should be introduced at all has yet to be
convincingly made.’
17 Sovereign and interbank loans (as well as securitisation tranches) were found to be more heavily
affected, in relative terms, than the corporate portfolio. However, due to its pivotal role among bank
loans, the latter exerts a stronger absolute effect on total capital requirements.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Figure 2. Contribution of partial portfolios to the overall change in capital
requirements for G-10 large, international banks adopting the IRB
foundation approach
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Overall
Note: Partial figures do not add up to the total, due to rounding.
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
The rise in capital requirements against corporate loans is hardly surprising, given the
structure of the weighing function adopted in the CP2. Under that function (see Figure
3), capital charges on corporate exposures remain unchanged at 8% for unsecured loans
to obligors having a 0.7% probability of default (roughly equivalent to a BB+ rating on
Standard & Poor’s scale). However, most bank borrowers would never achieve such a
rating because they are small, young or risky firms that capital markets are not willing
to fund directly. Obviously, then, if the average default probability of bank borrowers is
more than 0.7%, the CP2 function can only bring about an increase in capital
requirements.
18
Note that an overall rise in bank capital levels, although it enhances savers’ protection
and financial stability (at least in a static sense
19), might also turn out to be socially
undesirable as it leads to an increase in the cost of credit.
20 Moreover, if all banks were
to turn to capital markets to raise more Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, rationing problems
might arise, forcing them to cut their loan portfolios and thus reducing credit supply to
non-financial firms.
                                                
18 According to some historical estimates performed by the Bank of Italy in its Public Database (Base
Informativa Pubblica), the average yearly default rate for bank borrowers being granted facilities for
more than €2.5 million appears to range between 1.6% and 8.5% in different regions of the country. This
is much more than the 0.7% default probability needed to leave capital charges unchanged under the CP2
scheme. Moreover, estimates carried out by the Bank of Italy on a portfolio of loans issued by 51 Italian
banks to medium-large obligors show that 62% of the loans go to (mostly unrated) companies with a
credit quality equivalent to BB or below (see Marullo-Reedtz, 2000); should smaller firms be included,
this percentage would obviously increase.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Figure 3. Capital charges for loans of different quality according to present rules and
to CP2 proposals (a 50% LGD, 3-year maturity is assumed)
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This does not imply, however, that average capital requirements cannot be raised from
today’s 8%. Simply, it means that all assumptions and parameters in the CP2 model
must be carefully scrutinised before they come into effect, leading to a (potentially
painful) increase in capital ratios.
Among those parameters, asset correlation (r) has caught the attention of many bankers
and researchers. As seen in the previous section, its square-root (the factor-loading w)
measures a borrower’s sensitivity to the overall economic cycle (highlighting systematic
risk, like the b coefficient in the Capital Asset Pricing Model). In principle, then, each
obligor should be assigned a different w depending on the degree of ‘cyclicality’ of his
or her business. However, to keep things manageable, the CP2 sets r at 20% for all
corporate exposures.
Although such a value might be sensible for large firms, which respond heavily to
changes in the macroeconomic environment, medium-to-small companies seem to be
driven mainly by idiosyncratic elements, which reduce their average asset correlation.
In other words, small, low-quality firms usually tend to be riskier because of their own
weaknesses (such as bad management, poor financial planning, low-quality accounting).
This means that the effect of systematic risk on their profits, liquidity and financial
health is proportionately lower.
The 20% asset correlation used in the CP2 seems have been estimated mainly from
three data sources: the historical volatility of default rates measured by large rating
                                                
19 See below for a discussion of the procyclicality effect.
20 Given a 6% risk-premium on bank equity, for example, a 10% increase in the minimum capital ratio
(from 8% to 8.8%) would raise average bank rates by about 5 basis points.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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agencies such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s;
21 asset values estimated – through a
Merton-like model
22 – from the equity value of a wide sample of listed firms; and a
survey on the internal practices of a sample of large banks.
All these sources, however, might be somewhat biased towards large obligors, since
they are more likely to be agency-rated, listed or financed by large, internationally
active banks like those surveyed by the Basel Committee.
Actually, empirical analyses carried out on average commercial banks suggest that asset
correlations might be remarkably lower. For example Sironi and Zazzara (2001), based
on Italian data,
23 suggest that asset correlations might be of about 4% for corporate
obligors.
24 Even accounting for the fact that they are working on sample data, the
authors show that, in 95% of all cases, the ‘true’ value of r should not exceed 7.5%.
The Basel Committee has been working extensively on the calibration of  r.  In
November 2001 an informal note was issued  (‘Potential modifications to the
Committee’s Proposals’), suggesting that the asset correlation coefficient on corporate
exposures might be set below 20% (but not lower than 10%), depending on the
borrower’s probability of default (pi). In symbols, the r (i.e. w
2) in equation [15] should
be computed as:
[ ] % 20 ) ( 1 % 10 ) ( ￿ - + ￿ = i i i p p h h r
i.e. a weighted average of two extreme values (10% and 20%). The weight h would
depend on pi according to the following rule:
k
p k
i e
e
p
i
-
￿ -
-
-
=
1
1
) ( h
where k is a parameter (set at 50 in the November 2001 note) governing the steepness of
the function. A higher k implies that the h increases faster with pi, and therefore the ri
assigned to a low-quality borrower converges quickly to 10%.
This new rule would recognise the fact that (as mentioned above) riskier firms are
usually driven mostly by idiosyncratic factors, and therefore are less prone to systematic
                                                
21 Given some assumptions, asset correlation coefficients can be estimated from the time-series of default
rates: see Appendix F in Gupton et al. (1997) for details. Intuitively, if default rates tend to be more
volatile over time, this suggests that firms respond more heavily to economic cycles, so their asset
correlations must be higher.
22 Such estimates are regularly carried out by KMV, a San Francisco-based consultancy that specialises in
models connecting default probabilities to equity prices. See e.g. Crosbie (1999) for an introduction to
KMV’s use of Merton-like models.
23 Italy represents a favourable setting for empirical analyses, since the Central Credit Registry run by the
Central Bank has been maintaining statistics on bank defaults for the last 16 years.  Those statistics,
aggregated by loan size, industry and geographical area, were made public in 2000 and are updated every
year.
24 Obligors being granted credit lines of €250 million or more by the whole Italian banking system.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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risk.
25 It therefore would assign lower asset correlations to non-investment grade ratings
(see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Asset correlations ( r) for corporate obligors with different ratings
(unconditional probability of default pi is shown in parentheses)
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However, this is not the only modification to corporate risk-weights suggested in
November 2001.  As shown in Table 2, the conservative scale factor  s would be
eliminated (i.e. reduced to 1) and replaced by an increase in the confidence level of the
model (which would be set at 99.9%, instead of 99.5%).
Table 2. An overview of possible parameter changes for corporate exposures
January 2001 November 2001
Scale factor s 1.56 1
Maturity M 3 3
Confidence level 1-X 99.5% 99.9%
Asset correlation r=w
2 20% 10-20%
Expected losses Included Included
Note: Highlighted cells are changes from the CP2.
Those changes would significantly reduce capital weights for lower-quality corporate
exposures (see Figure 5), and would make capital requirements for non-investment
grade obligors even lower than those generated by the retail curve in the CP2.
26 Hence,
more sensible values of asset correlations would bring about a more sustainable overall
                                                
25 However, while this empirical rule is probably correct for small firms based in industrialised countries,
it might be more questionable for low-quality loans issued in the emerging markets, where risk can be
both high and systemic.
26 Note that this would greatly de-emphasise the choice of the criteria under which loans to small-medium
enterprises (SMEs) might qualify for the retail portfolio. Such criteria, which were only roughly sketched
in the CP2, were demanded by national authorities, but have proven difficult to identify without risking
jeopardising the ‘level playing field’ originally promoted by the Basel rules.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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capital charge. Moreover, since the change in capital requirements due to an obligor’s
downgrading would be less marked, the so-called pro-cyclical effects of prudential
regulation would also be reduced (although not so dramatically, see section 4.1).
Figure 5. Changes in the risk-weighting curve under different values of the model’s
parameters (a 50% LGD, 3-year maturity is assumed)
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Although the changes drafted in the November 2001 note do not represent by any
means a formal proposal, they seem to represent a step in the right direction. After all,
the aim of banking supervision is to protect depositors and markets from otherwise
unmanageable shocks, not to prevent single banks from failing. Actually, allowing
banks to fail might exert a beneficial effect on the financial system, as the fittest
institutions survive, and the less efficient ones disappear.  In this sense, a banking
system which is fully protected against bankruptcies does not look, in our eyes, as the
best possible one. As one supervisor once put it,
Requiring all of our regulated financial institutions to maintain insolvency
probabilities that are equivalent to a triple-A rating standard would be
demonstrably too stringent, because there are very few such entities among
unregulated financial institutions not subject to the safety net. That is, the markets
are telling us that the value of the financial firm is not, in general, maximised at
default probabilities reflected in triple-A ratings. This suggests, in turn, that
regulated financial intermediaries cannot maximise their value to the overall
economy if they are forced to operate at unreasonably high soundness levels
(Greenspan, 1998).
3.2 Other possible inconsistencies
Several concerns have been expressed about the appropriateness of the technical choices
made in the CP2.
27 For example, the presence of a  ‘haircut factor’  to discount the
                                                
27 See e.g. Institute of International Finance (2001), Danielsson et al. (2001) and Altman and Saunders
(2001). See also CSFI (2001) for an anthology of views on the NBCA.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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market value of financial and physical collateral has been openly criticised, as it might
lead to an underestimation of the role of such guarantees. The ‘granularity adjustment’
has been accused of being a pure concentration measure that increases capital charges
regardless of correlation-based diversification benefits. The risk of a sharp increase in
the cost of credit issued to small and medium-sized enterprises has also been
highlighted and the theoretical limits of value-at-risk measures (on which the CP2-
weights are based) have been stressed as well.
A thorough review of such comments, however, goes beyond the scope of this report
and would risk being both lengthy and incomplete. We prefer to focus on a couple of
aspect that  might deeply affect the effectiveness and robustness of the NBCA. The
former concerns the role of bank capital and the relationship between expected and
unexpected losses. It has been extensively addressed by the Basel Committee itself over
the last months and might lead to some meaningful revisions in the draft due to be
published in 2002. The latter deals with the link between default probability and loss
given default, and might undermine the soundness of Basel capital requirements, if
default risk and recovery risk prove to be correlated with each other.
The role of bank capital: Expected and unexpected losses. The CP2 chooses to cover
with regulatory capital all possible losses up to a given confidence level (1-X, to recall
the notation used above), for example, up to 99.5% of all possible cases. This means
that bank capital is used to shield both expected losses (ELs) and unexpected losses
(ULs) (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Expected and unexpected losses
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adequate amount of capital, so to avoid bankruptcy if actual losses exceed expected
losses.
The difference between ELs and ULs, then, is far from being merely theoretical, since it
determines how losses must be shielded by the bank and ‘priced’ to its present
borrowers. The decision not to distinguish between these two components in the CP2
therefore looks quite unsatisfactory, and should somewhat be reconsidered.
Note that this decision was partly justified by the desire to avoid the lengthy negotiation
process needed to redefine bank capital on an international scale. Actually, a change in
the international definition of bank capital, forcing banks to use reserves (instead of
shareholders’ capital or subordinated debt) to face expected losses, would be quite
attractive, but it represents quite a challenging step and would cause an unacceptable
delay in the Basel reform process. Thus, it can be left as a goal for future negotiations.
Meanwhile, the new supervisory rules should explicitly indicate how much capital is
required against EL and UL and, through the so-called second pillar, national
supervisors should ascertain that this distinction is actually incorporated into the banks’
capital planning policies and into their loan pricing schemes. Moreover, adjustments in
the capital charge linked to  ‘granularity’ and  ‘maturity’ effects should be applied to
unexpected losses only, not to total capital.
Some of the possible changes discussed over the last months, and highlighted by the
Basel Committee in its November 2001 note, show a greater willingness to take into
account the distinction between expected and unexpected losses. Namely, the note
suggests that efforts should be made to carefully and transparently distinguish the
capital needed to cover ULs from that used against ELs. These efforts would lead to an
array of ‘practical’ implications, since separate charges for ULs and ELs could allow the
introduction of some important changes to overall capital requirements, namely:
-  Defaulted exposures would be measured gross of specific provisions made against
expected losses; those provisions could be recognised as capital, at least as far as
they do not exceed the EL component; specific provisions based on the average
LGD ratio of a particular portfolio should be allowed to cover EL-related capital
charges also on other loans within the same portfolio.
-  General loss provisions that exceed the limits dictated by the present definition of
bank capital (1.25% of risk-weighted assets, or 50% of overall Tier 2 capital) could
be allowed to cover EL-related capital charges.
-  Expected losses on retail portfolios (excluding mortgages) could be excluded from
regulatory capital, since they are assumed to be shielded by the bank’s future
margins on the same kind of loans.
The last suggestion looks quite remarkable, as it would bring in a sharp decrease in
capital requirements against credit cards, revolving credits and similar forms of
consumer financing, where default rates tend to be high but stable, and ELs represent a
considerable share of future losses.
Figure 7 shows capital requirements on consumer loans, computed according to three
different rules: a) the CP2 capital ratio; b) the new formula proposed for consumer loans
in the November 2001 note, which excludes ELs (see Table 3, first and last column, for
a comparison with the CP2 approach); and c) the same formula, recomputed includingTHE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
17
ELs. As can be seen, excluding expected losses would make the compulsory capital
requirements significantly lower, and dramatically lower than those indicated in the
CP2. The capital ratio, even for risky exposures having a PD around 20%, would only
slightly exceed the present 8% level.
Table 3.  An overview of possible parameter changes for retail exposures
Nov 2001 Jan 2001
Mortgage Other
Scale factor s 1.56 1 1
Maturity M 3 1 1
Confidence level 1-X 99.5% 99.9% 99.9%
Asset correlation r=w2 8.13% 15% 4%-15%
Expected losses Included Included Excluded
Note: Highlighted cells are changes from the CP2.
Figure 7. Possible changes in capital requirements against consumer loans
(a 50% LGD, 3-year maturity is assumed)
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We are not sure, however, that such a practice would be fully sound and correct.
Advocates of expected-loss netting observe that, in businesses like credit cards, the high
margins available on the assets act as a buffer against losses, before recourse to general
provisions. In other words, today’s assets can pay the bill for yesterday’s losses, just as
today’s workers can pay pensions to their fathers in a ‘pay-as-you-go’ (PAYG) scheme,
provided that no dramatic demographic changes take place.
It is doubtful, however, that such a system would work, should the consumer loan
portfolio decrease in size or should the margins earned by the bank shrink. If an
economic downturn increases the default rates on consumer loans, while reducing the
amount of new loans demanded by individuals and families, the coverage of expected
losses granted by the PAYG scheme might turn out to be severely inadequate.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Note that such issues are well known to financial regulators. For example insurance
companies operating in the retail market (say, in car insurance), are usually requested to
set aside an adequate amount of EL-related reserves, and are not permitted to use future
earnings (i.e. insurance premia) to cover future losses implied in their current portfolio.
The coverage of expected losses through future margin income, therefore, should be
evaluated carefully, and admitted only to the extent that such income can be considered
stable, certain and unaffected by demand and spread cycles.
Actually, it seems to us that a clear distinction between EL- and UL-linked capital
should be used to make capital requirements more, not less demanding. As a rule,
expected losses should be covered by charge-offs in the current P&L account. If one
wants to offset them through expected future income, then the problem of unexpected
deviations from today’s income levels should be carefully addressed.
The LGD/PD link. According to the CP2 and to a widely accepted practice,
28
expected losses can be computed directly by multiplying PD by the expected LGD.
Since expected LGD is the conditional mean of loss, given that a default has occurred,
this is just an application of the standard formula for unconditional means:
PD LGD E PD PD LGD E PD D L E PD D L E L E ￿ = - ￿ + ￿ = - ￿ ￿ + ￿ = ) ( ) 1 ( 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (
However, such a result holds when the PD is known, and the uncertainty on future
losses arises only from the fact that default might actually take place or not. In real life,
though, PD itself is uncertain in the short-term (although its long-term value might be
known, since it depends on the creditworthiness of the borrower). In this case, the
simple relationship above does not hold any more. The following example
29 shows why.
Suppose that the long-term PD of a borrower is 6%, but this value grows to 10% in a
recession ( R PD =10%) and shrinks to 2% when the economy is in expansion
( E PD =2%). To keep things simple, both scenarios (expansion and recession) are
equally likely on an ex ante basis. Finally, suppose that the expected LGD is 50%, yet
this value moves up to 70% ( R LGD E( )) in recession years and decreases to 30%
( ) ( E LGD E ) during expansion years.
The expected loss – computed as an unconditional mean over all possible scenarios –
will be:
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while the simple product between expected LGD and unconditional PD would of course
equal 3% and would underestimate the true value by 80 basis points (i.e. by 21% in
relative terms).
                                                
28 See e.g. Jorion (2000).
29 This example was originally presented in Altman et al. (2001).THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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This suggests that the standard way of computing expected losses, although clearly
appropriate when the PD of a loan is fixed and certain, might be far from accurate when
default and recovery risk respond – to some extent – to the same background factors.
Note that the same problem would arise for unexpected losses (i.e. for risk measures
based on standard errors and percentiles), as noticed by Altman et al. (2001). There is a
risk that a whole system of capital requirements would then be downward biased if PD
and LGD were driven by some common causes and showed a significant, positive
correlation.
Table 4. The link between recoveries and default rates
(Pearson's correlation coefficients – yearly data)
Altman et al. (2001) show that, at least as far the US bond market is concerned, such a
correlation emerges rather clearly from the data of the last 15 years. Table 4, taken from
the above-mentioned study, suggests that recovery rates tend to decrease as defaults
become more frequent; taking logs, or absolute changes in default frequencies, as well
as focusing on the latest years in the sample do not weaken the strong link between
these two sources of risk.
30
4.  Some possible macro- and microeconomic effects of the NBCA
4.1  Credit availability and procyclicality issues
The NBCA risk-weights are guided by the willingness to achieve a closer
correspondence between compulsory capital charges and the intrinsic quality of loan
portfolios. This means that capital requirements must differentiate across banks  and
over time, i.e.:
-  at time t, financial institutions and systems lending to riskier obligors are asked to
raise more capital than the ‘safer’ ones; and
                                                
30 Note that, however, as recovery rates are measured through the market prices of defaulted bonds,
supply and demand might play a role in explaining the correlations shown in the table. Namely, as the
number of defaults increases, supply of defaulted bonds might exceed demand, and the price of defaulted
bonds might decrease, all other things being equal. Altman et al. (2001) deal with this problem through
multivariate regressions: these seem to confirm that a negative link between default frequencies and
recovery rates exists even when other market forces are factored in.
Default rate Default rate
(log)
Default rate
(change in)
Period: 1982-2000
   Recovery rate -67% -76% -71%
   Recovery rate (log) -70% -77% -72%
Period: 1987-2000
   Recovery rate -66% -74% -71%
   Recovery rate (log) -68% -75% -73%
Source: Altman et al. (2001).THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
20
- moving from time t to t+1, capital charges must evolve as the obligors’ riskiness
varies.
In other words, the NBCA is intrinsically aimed at discriminating among different
banks, countries and phases of the macroeconomic cycle. This discrimination might
have undesirable effects if it leads to a severe reduction in bank credit for emerging
countries. Similarly it risks exacerbating stability problems, instead of easing them, if it
widens cyclical fluctuations by making loan origination more difficult (and more
expensive) as the economy experiences a downturn.
In this section, we briefly review the first issue (credit rationing for the LDCs), then we
concentrate on the second one (procyclicality), presenting some simulations aimed at
quantifying the problem and at exploring some possible corrections.
Credit availability for less developed countries (LDCs). As pointed out, for example, by
Meier-Ewert (2001), the NBCA might exert some strong adverse consequences for
developing countries:
1.  The risk-weights stated in the CP2 would bring about tougher capital requirements
for high-risk borrowers, which form the customer base of most LDC banks,
excluding them from bank lending and/or increasing the cost of bank finance up to
unbearable levels (note that an increase in funding costs for obligors in the LDCs
would exert a perverse chain effect, since it would jeopardise their financial
stability, increasing their default probability and further reducing their ratings).
2.  The rise in the price of loans in LDCs is likely to be even more substantial, given
that the new rules for sovereign exposures might cause an upsurge in the cost of
credit for governments and banks based in the LDCs, i.e. in the ‘risk-free’ base rates
to which credit spreads on private loans are added.
3.  Moreover, the complexity of the Accord would bring about high compliance and
implementation costs, not only for banking institutions in the LDCs (many of which
cannot afford the heavy investments required by a sound IRB system), but also for
their regulators, who might not have enough resources to analyse and validate the
procedures set up by local banks, and by local subsidiaries of international financial
conglomerates.
4.  Finally, if the weighting function for corporate and retail exposures should be
calibrated along the lines shown in the previous  section  of this report, (that is,
reducing the CP2 requirements and creating some clear advantages for banks
adopting IRBs), sophisticated banks from industrialised countries operating in the
LDCs might enjoy a strong competitive advantage compared to small, local banks,
which would be forced to adopt the standardised approach.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the costs incurred by an LDC-based bank
developing an IRB system would actually lead to a true improvement in its risk-
measurement techniques. Actually, as noted by Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001), local
and foreign banks operating in many LDCs have no access to robust, long-term
historical default data for all classes of borrowers. This could make their risk-THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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assessments very subjective, thereby weakening the effectiveness of the NBCA and
exacerbating its procyclicality effects.
31
Similar risks emerge also in the standardised approach (where borrowers are evaluated
through external agencies). As noted by Cornford (2001), since big rating firms enjoy a
limited national coverage in most LDCs, some new, less skilled agencies would
probably emerge, the reliability of which could only be tested (at some cost) in the years
to come. Moreover, even well established agencies have proved regrettably slow at
revising their assessments of LDC debtors when financial crises take place. The costs of
implementing the NBCA in the less developed countries, therefore, could be only
partially matched by true risk-measurement benefits.
Procyclicality. Procyclicality is somewhat inherent in financial markets, and cannot be
blamed on regulation. As noted by Borio et al. (2001), procyclicality is caused mainly
by the fact that lenders, due to information asymmetries, judge the quality of the
investment projects pursued by borrowers in a noisy way. To overcome noise and
opaqueness, they tend to use the behaviour of other lenders (and the market value of
collateral) as a signal of the true worth of the projects.  Therefore, when markets are
depressed, information asymmetries can mean that even borrowers with profitable plans
find it difficult to obtain funding: the opposite is true when the cycle is booming.
Procyclicality becomes stronger when all market participants tend to behave according
to the same risk-management rules, thereby mutually reinforcing their beliefs and
expectations. As mentioned by Danielsson et al. (2001), forecasting risk is not like
forecasting weather, in that future volatility (unlike rain)  is  affected by volatility
forecasts.  This endogeneity may be innocuous in ‘calm’  times, when the actions of
many heterogeneous market participants tend to offset each other, yet it becomes crucial
in times of crisis when all investors and lenders, using similar models, pursue the same
strategies and the same self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, if someone forecasts that
a given asset class will depreciate, and sells it accordingly, then those assets shall really
decrease in value, prompting more sales and reducing the price even further. For this
reason, all models and regulations injecting homogeneity into the behaviour of market
participants are likely to magnify price movements and economic cycles.
32
This is certainly the case of the capital adequacy rules proposed in the NBCA, which
force banks to adopt a somewhat homogenous evaluation of risks.
The Basel rules are based on a minimum level in the ratio of bank capital to weighted
assets. In the NBCA, as in the 1988 protocol, losses reduce capital (the numerator in the
quotient) when the economic cycle deteriorates and defaults become apparent.
Furthermore, which is typical of the  new Accord, weighted assets (the denominator)
increase as borrowers are downgraded, due to an economic downturn. To comply with
                                                
31 As noted by Griffith-Jones and  Spratt (2001),  when risk becomes a quantification of subjective
expectations, this produces high levels of uncertainty and creates strong incentives to herd, with
developing countries periodically going ‘in and out of fashion’.
32 As noted by Davies (2001), risk should be contrasted by encouraging diversity: ‘Populations are at risk
of extinction when they concentrate – be it a physical concentration (putting them at risk of some natural
disaster such as flood or earthquake) or when they have genetic concentration (putting them at risk of
disease or environmental change). To encourage concentration in risk analysis and management is to
create risk of extreme events.’THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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the regulatory 8% limit in the capital ratio, banks are then forced to reduce credit supply
and to increase the cost of loans. This in turn makes recessions even worse.
This is a side effect of the closer integration between regulatory and economic capital
that is pursued in the NBCA. It is generally accepted
33 that the optimal amount of bank
capital tends to increase when the economic cycle slows (and credit risks turn into
actual losses): the ‘Basel capital’ just mimics this behaviour. In other words, by making
supervisory requirements closer to the banks’ endogenous models, the new Accord is
bound to increase procyclicality, at least to some extent.
34
This was clearly shown by Ervin and Wilde (2001) through a simulation summarised in
Table 5. A loan portfolio originally consisting only of BBB-rated obligors is first
considered at the end of 1989, then one year later. Based on the transition matrices
released by Standard & Poor’s for 1990, only 6 out of 1000 obligors default over the 12
months.
35  However, due to unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, downgrades
clearly outweigh upgrades, so that at end-1990, the average quality of the portfolio
worsens significantly. What are the consequences of those changes for capital charges?
According to the 1988 Accord, only defaults would affect capital, since they require a
charge-off that roughly matches the estimated LGD on non-performing loans (e.g.
50%). However, in the NBCA framework, rating changes affect capital requirements as
well.
As shown in the table, capital requirements tend to be less demanding under the CP2
weights than they were according to the old protocol (as in the case of a BBB-rated
portfolio of three-year corporate exposures with 50% LGD). Nonetheless, the
adjustment required in bank capital is quite more dramatic – moving from 4% to 4.8%
implies a 20% increase, while a change from 8% to 8.2% is no more than a 3% change
in relative terms.
To get some further insight into the procyclicality effects of the NBCA, we present a
new simulation exercise, carried out along the guidelines set by Ervin and Wilde, but
aimed at enhancing their results in several directions. Namely:
-  We will not limit our analysis to a single year, but will try to cover a longer time
period, ranging from 1981 to 2000, to fully appreciate the behaviour of the new
Basel rules throughout a whole economic cycle.
                                                
33 Since capital is raised by banks to offset risks and minimise the expected costs of failure, its optimal
level, at least in a static framework, tends to be positively correlated with financial risks. However, these
conclusions have recently been challenged by Estrella (2001) who, based on a multi-period, infinite-
horizon model with capital-adjustment costs, finds that the optimal level of bank capital is negatively
correlated with present risks, measured by a value-at-risk measure. As mentioned by the author, these
results differ from conventional wisdom.  They might depend,  however  to some extent, on the way
economic cycles are modelled.  Those are assumed to follow a fully predictable pattern, and to be
perfectly known to bankers, who choose their optimal capital level after calculating all expected future
losses.
34 Alternatively, the NBCA might force banks to hold a large capital cushion in excess of minimum
requirements, to avoid the costs (and risks) of raising new capital during economic downturns. This
‘indirect’ cost of procyclicality was highlighted, e.g., by Jokivuolle and Peura (2001).
35 Asset quality deteriorated sharply in 1990 in the US,  which is why Ervin and  Wilde chose this
particular year to show the procyclicality effects of the NBCA.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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-  We will simulate both the evolution of assets and that of the bank’s overall interest-
based profits; in other words, loans will not just originate losses, but also a margin
income (based on some risk-related pricing rules
36); by combining income and
losses, we will be able to simulate endogenous capital fluctuations over time.
Table 5. Procyclicality effects in the NBCA: A numerical example
Portfolio
composition 1988 Capital Accord NBCA – CP2
End-
1989
End-
1990
Weights End-1989
Requirements
End-1990
Requirements
Weights End-1989
Requirements
End-1990
Requirements
AAA 0.0% 8.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0%
AA 0.0% 8.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0%
A 4.2% 8.0% 0.3% 1.8% 0.1%
BBB 100% 89.1% 8.0% 8.0% 7.1% 4.0% 4.0% 3.5%
BB 5.2% 8.0% 0.4% 11.6% 0.6%
B 0.9% 8.0% 0.1% 26.0% 0.2%
CCC 0.0% 8.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0%
Default 0.6% 50.0% 0.3% 50.0% 0.3%
TOTAL 100% 100% 8.0% 8.2% 4.0% 4.8%
Source: Ervin and Wilde (2001).
Our simulation exercise mimics the evolution over time of a bank’s assets. The initial
portfolio composition of the bank (at the end of 1980) was chosen arbitrarily, as shown
in Table 6. However, this choice is based upon the estimates gathered by Treacey and
Carey in 1997 from a sample of 26 US banks. Using European data (namely, data
estimated by the Bank of Italy and reported in Marullo-Reedtz, 2000) would not alter
the final results significantly.
38
All loans are supposed to have a three-year maturity and a 50% LGD. In the table, we
suppose that the initial loan stock of the bank is €1 m illion, so we can use absolute
amounts as well as percentages.
From 1981 till 2000, the bank’s portfolio mix changes accordingly to S&P transition
matrices
39 (based on static pools). Rates on new loans are revised to compensate for
their changes in riskiness, yet margins earned on ‘old loans’ remain unchanged (since
the loans have a three-year maturity, this means that only 1/3 of the loans can be re-
priced). Losses emerge according to the empirical default rates recorded by S&P and the
loans’ LGD (given a 50% LGD, a €100 default means a €50 loss).
                                                
36 The spread set by the bank covers expected losses and capital costs (see the Appendix  for details). The
risk-free rate is set at 5%, while the bank’s unit cost of capital is 10%.
37 The spread set by the bank covers expected losses and capital costs (see the Appendix  for details). The
risk-free rate is set at 5%, while the bank’s unit cost of capital is 10%.
38 The use of data on rated bonds would probably have introduced a severe bias, as the average credit
quality of bonds tend to be better than that of bank loans (after all, banks are there to screen and monitor
investment projects that are too risky for the capital markets).
39 Standard & Poor’s (2001). We are aware that bond data and through-the-cycle ratings are not fully apt
to represent the behaviour of bank loans, yet we believe that such limitations are outweighed by the
benefits of using public, certified, long-term data as those supplied by S&P.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Table 6. Portfolio mix used in our simulations (%)
1980 1990 2000
AAA 3.0% 2.7% 2.4%
AA 5.0% 7.4% 8.6%
A 13.0% 20.2% 24.8%
BBB 28.0% 24.5% 29.7%
BB 39.0% 20.9% 18.5%
B 10.0% 20.3% 13.8%
CCC 2.0% 3.9% 2.1%
Note: The 1980 mix was chosen arbitrarily, based on bank data
reported in Treacey and Carey (2000); subsequent
evolutions were generated through S&P historical
transition matrices.
Figure 8 shows the main results of our simulation:
1.  The first panel reports three indicators of the credit quality cycle: the default rate
measured by Standard and Poor’s on US bonds, the default rate experienced by the
bank (given its portfolio mix) and the ‘net downgrade rate’  (downgrades minus
upgrades, over total outstanding issues). Note that scales are inverted, since an
increase in these variables means that the cycle is getting worse. As can be seen,
default and downgrade risks fluctuate up and down in the 1980s, hit a low in the
early  1990s, then keep improving in the following years, although they worsen
again towards the end of the decade.
2.  The second panel reports a measure of credit availability: the percent change in the
loan portfolio made possible (or necessary) by the evolution of the capital ratios.
When the margin income exceeds credit losses, and/or capital requirements decrease
because of a favourable evolution in the quality mix of the loans, the bank’s capital
grows beyond the minimum requirements. We then compute by how much the loan
portfolio could be enlarged. Similarly, when capital charges increase more than net
profits would allow, we estimate the reduction in loans needed to comply with the
Basel ratio.
41
Two results are worth mentioning. First, the procyclicality effect is driven by up-
and downgrades, rather than by default rates. In other words, adjustments in credit
supply needed to comply with capital requirements seem to respond mainly to
changes in the structure of weighted assets, and only to a minor extent to actual
credit losses. However this is not true in 1990-91, when the default rate is
exceptionally high.
                                                
40 Standard & Poor’s (2001). We are aware that bond data and through-the-cycle ratings are not fully apt
to represent the behaviour of bank loans, yet we believe that such limitations are outweighed by the
benefits of using public, certified, long-term data as those supplied by S&P.
41 The charts report simulations based on the CP2 curves and on the November 2001 versions; note that
retail curves are reported for illustrative purposes only, as the loan portfolio and the transition matrices
used in our exercise refer to corporate exposures. A separate exercise, based on a different loan mix and
transition structure, would be needed to carry out a reliable analysis of the retail curves.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
25
Figure 8. Main results of the base simulation
(b) Simulation results: Change in loan portfolio size
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Second, the new weight curve for corporate loans proposed in the November 2001
note, although it would considerably reduce capital requirements in a static sense,
would not ease the procyclicality effect, at least for loan portfolios with a rating mix
like the one shown in Table 6. The reason is that, although the increase in weights
when moving from an AAA- to a CCC-rated loan is lower, based on the November
2001 curve, rating changes for top-quality loans
44 can bring about a sharper rise in
capital requirements than they did under the CP2 function. This would slightly
enhance procyclicality in ‘normal times’ (when most rating changes affect the
middle part of the scale). However, the new curve would smooth cyclical effects
                                                
42 See Table A.1 in the Appendix.
43 Note that such widespread downgradings might be more usual for bank loans (where ratings are
assigned ‘point in time’, and respond quickly to the cycle) than for rated bonds.
44 See Table A.1 in the Appendix.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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under extreme scenarios, when a large part of bank borrowers moves to the bottom
grades of the rating scale.
45
3.  As mentioned before, in our model the bank earns different spreads on the loans,
according to their rating; therefore, as the quality mix of the portfolio evolves over
time, the cost of credit for bank customers fluctuates too. The third panel in the
figure shows the average spread paid by borrowers, which is another important
indicator of the credit cycle.
As can be seen, bank rates tend to anticipate the default cycle (as they are driven mainly
by net downgrades), then remain high as the default rate hits its peak. In this sense they
tend to be procyclical, as they stay high as credit supply shrinks, so that  ‘price’ and
‘quantity’ effects can be mutually reinforcing. The shift from the CP2 to the November
2001 curves, while reducing the average level of the spreads, does not alter their profile
over time. The reason is that banks have to factor in future losses when pricing new
loans, regardless of compulsory capital ratios. Since bank credit spreads depend heavily
on expected losses, capital requirements cannot (and probably should not try to)
interfere with their movements. Note that, however, base rates can be governed by
policy-makers, and the overall cost of bank credit can be reduced, even when banks
increase their margins to offset an upsurge in risks.
Figure 9 shows what happens to our simulation when LGDs tend to change with
empirical default rates. Instead of using a fixed 50% LGD, here, we let it fluctuate
between 60% (in high-default years) and 40% (in low-default years).
46 Note that a
similar setting may become realistic when banks move to the advanced IRB approach
and start using their own LGD estimates. These are likely to be revised upwards in
recession years, when collateral values decrease and the market for distressed firms
slows down due to an excess of supply. Revised LGDs are used both to set loan spreads
and to compute capital requirements.
As can be seen, procyclical swings tend to be much wider than in the base case (the
results of the base simulation for the CP2 corporate curve have been reported in Figure
9, to make comparisons easier). Bank spreads, too, become even more volatile than in
the previous simulation, since now short-term LGD estimates are factored into loan
prices. Thus, if a positive correlation between default and recovery risk (like that
highlighted by Altman et al. for US bonds), were to be confirmed by bank data, the
procyclicality effects of the NBCA might be much more severe than expected.
Of course, one might object that the bank in our model behaves in a somewhat myopic
way, and that regulation should encourage ‘advanced’ IRB systems to use long-term
average recovery rates (instead of revising them yearly, according to short-term signals
like the current default rate). However, while the use of long-term LGDs would make
procyclicality effects less marked, it would also force banks to maintain a less updated
picture of their risks, thereby trading stability for precision.
                                                
45 Note that such widespread downgradings might be more usual for bank loans (where ratings are
assigned ‘point in time’, and respond quickly to the cycle) than for rated bonds.
46 We used a second-degree polynomial to model the link between LGDs and empirical default rates, so
that LGD is 50% when default rates are at their 20-year average (2%), LGD is 60% when default rates hit
their 20-year maximum (5%) and LGD is 40% when default rates hit their 20-year low (0%).THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Figure 9. Effects of the correlation between default risk and recovery risk
(b) Simulation results: Change in loan portfolio size
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The link between procyclicality and sound provisioning practices.  As suggested, for
example, by Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), cyclical shortages of banks capital may not
only be due to the risk-based regulation of bank capital but also (and most prominently)
to the lack of a risk-based regulation of the banks’ loan loss provisioning practices. The
blame for pro-cyclical effects associated with capital shortages could therefore shift
from the contents of the currently proposed capital regulation to its limited scope, since
no compulsory provisioning scheme has been included in the NBCA.
As mentioned in section 3.2, expected losses should be deducted from the profit and
loss account and covered through reserves in ‘quiet’ (i.e. favourable) years; however,
there is no international regulation forcing banks to follow such a principle. Actually,
some national laws even prevent banks from making adequate provisions because that is
seen as a form of profit-smoothing, aimed only at reducing the tax bill.
                                                
47 We used a second-degree polynomial to model the link between LGDs and empirical default rates, so
that LGD is 50% when default rates are at their 20-year average (2%), LGD is 60% when default rates hit
their 20-year maximum (5%) and LGD is 40% when default rates hit their 20-year low (0%).THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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In this context, it comes as no surprise that loan-loss provisioning by banks tends to be
negatively correlated with the macroeconomic cycle.  Most banks accept to pay for
losses only when these are about to materialise instead of setting aside an adequate
volume of EL-related reserves when high operating profits would make provisioning
easier.
This was clearly shown by Borio et al. (2001), who analysed the link between bank
provisions (i.e. provisions for loan losses over total assets) and a macroeconomic
indicator (output gap, as calculated by the OECD). Going back to the 1980s, they found
negative correlations for most industrialised countries, suggesting that banks are not
willing (and/or not permitted) to exploit expansion years to increase their loan-loss
reserves.
On the other hand, Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), using a more sophisticated,
multivariate model, found some evidence of a positive association between loan-loss
provisioning and banks’ EBTD. As in most G10 countries, however, this suggests that
provisions tend to increase in ‘good’ times, but do not prove  to be  fully adequate to
cover subsequent losses. Moreover, this result does not hold for banks operating in
emerging countries, where low provisioning in the upswing phase of the cycle makes it
necessary to increase provisions during periods of financial distress. These empirical
studies support the view that if some sound provisioning rules were included in
international capital regulation, they may exert a meaningful anti-cyclical effect.
48 As
noted by Cornford (2001), the point is that inadequate provisioning could contribute to
excessive cyclicality in bank lending, since the increased provisions following a cyclical
downturn will ultimately lead to less new lending.
Figure 10 shows what would happen to our simulation results if banks were required to
set aside adequate provisions against expected losses. To be precise, we have assumed
that a bank is not allowed to distribute profits (or to use extra capital to increase its loan
portfolio) unless all expected losses have been covered through provisions.
49 Note that
while actual losses have to be charged off regardless of the bank’s operating profits,
provisions against expected losses never exceed the net margin income (so they tend to
smooth the bank’s profit cycle). When losses occur, provisions are the first buffer used
to offset them: the bank’s capital is used only when they are not enough.
As concerns corporate exposures (see panel ‘a’ in Figure 10), compulsory provisions
would not alter the average profile of our  ‘procyclicality curves’. They would act,
however, as a good ‘parachute’ in the worst phases of the credit cycle (see the 1990-93
period).
The reason is that, as noted above, the evolution of capital requirements in ‘normal
times’ is driven mainly by transitions across performing states (affecting the
denominator of the capital ratio), while losses hit capital (i.e. the numerator) only when
                                                
48 Note that a system of compulsory ‘statistical provisions’ (i.e. provisions against future losses on today’s
performing loans) was introduced in Spain in 1999.  See Poveda (2000) and De Lis et al.  (2001) for
details.
49 Note that, strictly speaking, these provisions are not capital, in that they are not raised from
shareholders but are deducted from past earnings; however, although this has not been done in our
simulation, capital charges should be reduced when a bank increases its provisions, to avoid covering
expected losses twice.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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credit risk actually strikes. Compulsory provisions against expected losses, although
they cannot smooth the capital charges due to rating transitions, provide the bank with a
buffer to partially isolate its capital from actual losses.
Figure 10. Effects of compulsory provisions on procyclicality
(a) Simulation results for corporate loans: change in portfolio size
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Panel ‘b’ in Figure 10 shows some more simulations concerning retail weights. Note
that these are for illustrative purposes only, since S&P transition data are based on
corporate bonds and do not provide us with a reliable representation of consumer credit
cycles. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that compulsory provisions would
significantly smooth loan supply even for this class of exposures (where the weighing
functions set up by the Basel committee are generally less steep than for corporate
facilities).
45
Moreover, from panel ‘b’ one can clearly see that the anti-cyclical effect of EL-based
provisions would be especially strong for consumer loans, under the approach outlined
by the Basel Committee in its November 2001 note (that is, when bank capital is
                                                
50 Note that the three-year maturity used in our model might be overly pessimistic for consumer loans.
For credit cards, for instance, banks usually may change their rates and exposures on very short notice,
but a three-year maturity could not be too unrealistic for standard instalment loans (excluding mortgages).THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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required only against unexpected losses). This reinforces our belief (see section 3.2
above) that if expected losses in the retail market were to be covered entirely through
future margin income, procyclicality effects might worsen significantly.
51
4.2  Some effects of the NBCA for the banking firms
The previous section highlighted the major effects of the NBCA for the financial system
as a whole. Before concluding our report, we now try to sketch the main consequences
that the  new Accord is likely to exert on individual banks and on their competitive
equilibria.
The effects on individual banks. Implementation costs are the first, and most certain
channel through which the NBCA is going to affect the profitability of individual banks.
Complexity is one of the most striking features of the new Accord, and setting up some
“Basel-compliant” risk-control systems is going to be a major challenge, both for
bankers and their supervisors.
As highlighted, for example, by Lannoo (2001), complexity costs are expected to be
particularly high in the European Union, where the implementation process is going to
be especially cumbersome, since a new directive (or a substantial amendment of the
existing ones) will be needed to translate the Basel principles into practice. The
interaction between the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European
and national Parliaments and, finally, national supervisors is likely to produce a
complex network of requirements, not only for banks but for also for other firms
operating in the financial services industry.
IIF (2001) produced a rough estimate of the implementation costs of Basel II
54 (see
Figure 11). Supposing that about 30,000 banks in the world have to stand compliance
costs due to the NBCA, and that the average cost ranges between $0.5 and $15 million a
year for five years, the net present value of these costs (computed using a 5% reference
rate) might well exceed $1,000 billion (left-hand scale).
As shown by the right axis, this amounts to a considerable share of the total  tier 1
capital held by all banks in the world (which IIF estimates at about $2,000 billion).
Implicitly, these figures suggest that, at least in the short-term, the first effect of a
regulatory reform supposed to improve the banks’ capital adequacy might be that of
eroding a considerable portion of it.
Hopefully, such costs are going to be offset by adequate rewards. These are not to be
found only in the ‘capital savings’ (i.e. the reductions, relative to the  ‘standard’ 8%
                                                
51 Note that the three-year maturity used in our model might be overly pessimistic for consumer loans.
For credit cards, for instance, banks usually may change their rates and exposures on very short notice,
but a three-year maturity could not be too unrealistic for standard instalment loans (excluding mortgages).
52 The anti-cyclical effects of compulsory provisions have also been shown by De Lis et al. (2001) in a
simulation exercise based on Spanish data, which include both corporate and retail loans.
53 Note that the three-year maturity used in our model might be overly pessimistic for consumer loans.
For credit cards, for instance, banks usually may change their rates and exposures on very short notice,
but a three-year maturity could not be too unrealistic for standard instalment loans (excluding mortgages).
54 As noted by Lannoo (2001), complexity costs may not be just implementation costs. As banks move
away from the simple, accountable rules of Basel I, this lack of transparency will bring about some costs
of its own, since capital adequacy evaluations will grow more uncertain and obscure.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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capital ratio) that some high-quality banks should be able to achieve when they set up
adequate internal rating systems.
The main advantages should lie in the efficiency gains brought about by new risk
management methodologies:  a more objective and stable assessment of credit risk,
sounder pricing and provisioning practices and better reporting standards through which
the different rings of the ‘value chain’ inside the bank may be separately spotted and
analysed.
Moreover, as the pricing of loans (although still based on a subjective appraisal of the
borrower’s creditworthiness) becomes more transparent, and standard rules emerge for
the computation of the risk premia required to different obligors, it will be easier to
create, widen and maintain a secondary market of bank loans. Credit origination and
lending will become more and more distinct. Banks will be increasingly able to set up
credit facilities, then to ‘package’ them in a standardised form and to pass on the risk to
final investors. The gap between banks and markets, although it will by no means
disappear, is likely to decrease. Fair-value accounting of bank loans will become less
unusual, and the degree of accountability of the decisions taken by bank managers will
substantially increase.
Figure 11. Implementation costs for a population of 30,000 banks (5-year NPV)
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As concerns the banks’ internal organisation, the credit department will still be
responsible for the creation of new facilities, and for the management and enhancement
of customer relationships. However, the measurement of total credit risks, as well as the
validation of the rating procedures through which day-to-day operations are carried out,
will be the responsibility of a separate function. This might be either the risk
management office or some new department supervising the whole credit policy of the
bank, and checking that risk diversification and capital adequacy plans are carefully
planned and executed. Those are not going to be purely technical roles, as they will get
fully involved in the top management’s strategic decisions.
The effects on competitive equilibria.  The implementation of the NBCA is likely to
make the competitive behaviour of banks both more uniform and more patchy.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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A stronger uniformity will be the result of the adoption, by many banks, of the same
risk-management tools and procedures. This might prove beneficial, if financial
institutions are forced to move towards the  ‘efficient frontier’ by adopting more
sophisticated and rigorous practices; unintended consequences might follow, however,
that reduce the degree of efficiency and stability of the system.
As far as stability is concerned, we noted in section 4.2 that the adoption of a uniform
risk-assessment model by all market participants is likely to magnify the swings in the
economic and financial cycle. As for the banking system’s efficiency, a more pervasive
regulation (think of the second pillar, enabling supervisors to influence and shape the
banks’ risk-evaluation practices) risks reducing the role of markets, cancelling out the
differences between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bankers.
While the behaviour of large banks, adopting internal rating systems along the
guidelines dictated by the NBCA, should become more uniform, the landscape might
also become more patchy as concerns smaller institutions, forced to stick to the
‘standard’ weights or implementing simplified versions of the IRB approach.
Thus, the gap between small and larger intermediaries is likely to widen. This might
lead to a sort of ‘winner’s curse’, jeopardising the future profitability and stability of
local banks. Such banks, in fact, might increase their market shares only to find out, in
the following years, that they have supplied credit to the wrong borrowers (i.e. to
borrowers deemed unprofitable by their larger competitors).
To avoid this adverse-selection effect, even small banks will be forced to invest in
sound credit-risk measurement systems, which, in turn, will increase the
‘implementation’ costs
55 mentioned earlier in this section.
5. Concluding remarks
The NBCA is going to exert some far-reaching effects on the day-to-day behaviour of
banks and credit markets.  Some seemingly  ‘technical’ choices,  such as parameter
calibration and recovery-risk treatment, are going to affect credit supply and economic
cycles heavily. This is why research contributions aimed at validating and refining the
mechanisms on which the Accord will be founded should be welcome not only by
scholars and academics, but also by practitioners and policy-makers.
In this report, we tried to provide the reader with a complete, up-to-date, critical picture
of the NBCA by summarising its structure and possible changes.
We first focused on the risk of a generalised increase in capital levels, a danger that
would have been quite real if CP2 weights had not been carefully discussed, and
amended in  recent  months.  We have seen that the use of lower asset correlation
coefficients for riskier borrowers represents a reasonable way of making the weighing
function less steep, reducing the threat of a generalised increase in the cost of credit for
‘typical’ bank borrowers.
                                                
55 Note that these are not, strictly speaking, implementation costs, since an IRB-system will not be
required for small banks. Since the use of an IRB approach by larger competitors is going to push local
banks towards it, however, this can be regarded as a sort of ‘indirect implementation cost’.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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So capital requirements may be eased to account for the risk-diversification benefits due
to the idiosyncratic nature of small obligors. Meanwhile, however, they m ay also need
to be tightened, since ignoring the correlation between default and recovery risks might
lead to a structural underestimation of future credit losses. We have seen that a 70%
correlation between default rates and LGDs was found on the US bond market.  If
similar values were to exist for banking loans, the use of a regulatory model based on
independence between PD and LGD might be seriously questioned. Moreover, we have
shown that, if banks adopting the ‘advanced’ approach to internal ratings should update
their LGD estimates based on the credit risk cycle, the procyclicality effects of the new
Basel protocol might be stronger than expected.
To contrast such procyclicality dangers, the new regulation should fully acknowledge
the difference between expected and unexpected losses, and supervisors should ask
banks to make use of this distinction in their pricing and provisioning practices.
Through a simulation exercise we have shown that by imposing compulsory provisions
against expected losses, the risk of credit rationing in ‘bad’ years could be significantly
reduced (although procyclicality effects due to rating transitions would still exist).
On the other hand, if the distinction between EL- and UL-linked capital should be used
to make capital requirements less demanding (e.g. for consumer loans), procyclicality
might increase, because one cannot fully rely on future assets to pay the bill for losses
generated by today’s portfolio (in this sense, the crisis of PAYG pension schemes seems
to have much to teach).
Summing up, asset correlation issues, recovery risks, bank provisions and procyclicality
represent four sensitive areas in which no mistakes can be allowed, if the New Basel
Capital Accord is to represent a significant step towards better risk assessment
techniques and financial stability. The huge implementation costs of the Accord (and
the deep organisational changes that banks will have to undergo to embrace the new
paradigm) mean that the NBCA must bring along some clear, tangible benefits, and no
drawbacks.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Appendix. Details of the Procyclicality Simulations
As mentioned in the text, our simulation exercise mimics the evolution over time of
capital and assets of a bank, using one-year transition matrices (based on static pools)
released by Standard & Poor’s for  the  years between 1981 and 2000. The generic
transition matrix T can be seen as follows:
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where Tp denotes transitions across non-defaulted (“performing”) states, while d is a
vector of default rates. The bottom row (all zeroes and a “1”) simply indicates that
defaulted loans cannot go back to a performing state.
Let ct be the vector (such that 1 = ￿
j
j c ) describing the composition, by rating class, of
the bank’s performing loans at the end of year t. Using transition matrices one can
compute the default rate experienced by the bank in the following year simply as
t c d 1 + ¢ t , while the distribution of loans across performing states, at the end of the
following year, will tend to  t 1 t p, c T + ¢
However, the bank loans considered in our simulation are not perpetual. We assume that
they have a three-year maturity, so every year 1/3 of total loans expires, and has to be
replaced through new issues (we assume that those new issues are chosen according to
the bank’s initial portfolio composition, ct). Moreover, defaulted loans also have to be
replaced, to leave the portfolio size unchanged.
Hence, the actual composition of the bank’s performing loans portfolio at the end of
year t+1 must be computed as:
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(the bank’s portfolio composition at time 0, c0, must be set arbitrarily, as described in
Table 6 in the text).
Further, we can compute the vector of capital weights w associated with different rating
classes using the standard formula stated in equation [15]. To do so, we must know the
default probabilities attached to the different classes, the maturity and the LGD of the
loans. We use a  three-year maturity and a 50% LGD.  Table A.1 shows the PDs
associated with our rating scale (also called vector p
56 in the following) and the weights
dictated by different calibration options (note that these are basically the same values
shown in Figures 5 and 7 in the text)
                                                
56 These PDs are long-term averages of S&P’s one-year default rates, as reported in Standard & Poor’s
(2001). Note that p (expected default probabilities) is conceptually different from d (actual default rates).THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Table A.1 Default probabilities and risk weights of the rating classes
CP2 weights November 2001 weights
pj Corporate Retail Corporate Mortgage Consumer
AAA 0.005% 0.41% 0.18% 0.60% 0.09% 0.09%
AA 0.010% 0.60% 0.27% 0.84% 0.16% 0.15%
A 0.042% 1.37% 0.62% 1.72% 0.50% 0.48%
BBB 0.233% 3.97% 1.89% 4.14% 1.91% 1.71%
BB 1.072% 10.44% 5.37% 8.17% 5.79% 4.35%
B 5.939% 29.20% 17.53% 16.01% 17.34% 7.64%
CCC 25.259% 58.74% 43.93% 33.44% 35.87% 11.42%
To keep things simple, each rating class has a default probability that is stable over
time. In other words, the default risk associated with each grade does not change over
time, but represents a long-term value that is not revised by the bank as the cycle
changes.
57 Therefore, vector w depends on how function [15] is calibrated by regulators,
not on t.
The spread (mj) on the risk-free rate (r
f) required by the bank on a class-j loan is set in
such a way that the expected income on the loan
LGD p p m r j j j
f + - + + ) 1 )( 1 (
equals total funding costs (including the cost ke on the amount of capital wj that the bank
has to set aside to comply with supervisory requirements).
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Solving for mj we get
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However, this pricing rule is applied only to new loans. Facilities issued in previous
years keep their spread unchanged when they migrate into a different rating class.
                                                
57 This means that changes in the overall portfolio quality are modelled through transitions from one class
to another, not by updating the risk characteristics of each class. Note that this might be too simplistic, as
the PD of each rating class is likely to be revised upwards in bad times, and downwards in quiet years
(this is the norm for rating agencies working ‘through the cycle’, as pointed out e.g. by Treacey and
Carey, 2000). However, such a behaviour would surely contribute to make cyclical changes even deeper,
so if such a mechanism were included in our simulations, the procyclicality effects we found in the text
would only become stronger.
58 Note that this is a one-year rate, while the loan portfolio used in this simulation has a maturity of three
years. An expression for the yearly spread associated with a  three-year horizon could be derived
following the same logic used for the one-year spread (see e.g. Resti, 2000, for details). However, this
would make our simulation more complex and less transparent, without adding much to the final results.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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Thus, to compute the net margin income earned by the bank we need to estimate the
composition of its loan portfolio  by original rating, that is, ignoring migrations of
‘seasoned’ loans. At the end of year t, this composition can be reasonably approximated
as follows:
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Multiplying by the spread vector, m = [ mj], gets the (unit) margin income for the
following year:
59
*
1 t t M c m¢ = + [A.6]
(equations [A.5] and [A.6] try to model the fact that bank margins are ‘sticky’, since
price adjustments affect only new loans).
Losses suffered in year t+1 can be computed simply as
( ) t t t LGD L c d 1 1 + + ¢ = [A.7]
When the bank makes no provisions against future losses, the endogenous change in its
capital is just the difference between these two quantities. If capital at time t+1 (i.e.
1 1 + + - + ¢ t t L M t c w ) is more than the minimum requirement  1 t c w + ¢ , the bank will be
able to expand its loan portfolio.  Conversely, if capital is less than the required
minimum, a reduction in loans will be required.
This change in loan supply can be used as an indicator of procyclicality.
60 Another good
indicator is given by the adjustment in the average spread required by the bank on new
loans. While the former measures credit availability, the latter estimates the effect of
economic cycles on credit prices.
                                                
59 Note that we are implicitly assuming that defaults and portfolio adjustments take place at the end of the
year; this might be unrealistic, but helps us keep our simulation exercise manageable. Moreover, we
assume that portfolio adjustments are instantaneous and costless, which is an overly optimistic approach:
when defaulted loans have to be replaced by new issues, this takes time (i.e. foregone spreads) and
screening efforts (that is, operating costs).
60 Alternatively, one might measure the exogenous capital flow ( 1 1 1 + + + + + - - ¢ = t t t L M f ) c (c w t 1 t )
needed to match ‘endogenous’ capital and regulatory capital.THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
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